We consider voting correspondences that are, besides Condorcet Consistent, immune against the two strong no show paradoxes. That is, it cannot happen that if an additional voter ranks a winning alternative on top then that alternative becomes loosing, and that if an additional voter ranks a loosing alternative at bottom then that alternative becomes winning. This immunity is called the Top Property in the first case and the Bottom Property in the second case. We establish the voting correspondence satisfying Condorcet Consistency and the Top Property, which is maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with these two properties. The result remains true if we add the Bottom Property but not if we replace the Top Property by the Bottom Property. This voting correspondence contains the Minimax Rule but it is strictly larger. In particular, voting functions (single-valued voting correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against the two paradoxes must select from this maximal correspondence, and we demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.
Introduction
Within a democratic voting system it should be in the own interest of voters not to abstain from voting. Abstaining from voting, however, can be rational even in voting systems that are often regarded as truly democratic. A recent example is the Dutch referendum for the EU Association Treaty with the Ukraine on April 6, 2016. A majority voted against this treaty, but the total voter turnout was hardly more than 2% above the minimally required 30%: if some of the 'yes' voters would have stayed at home then the referendum would have been invalid and the 'no' to the treaty avoided.
Another natural and desirable property of a voting system is Condorcet Consistency (de Condorcet, 1785) : if there is an alternative (candidate, political party, law, etc.) that is ranked above any other alternative by some majority of the voters, then that alternative should be chosen. Also this property is often not fulfilled. Again in The Netherlands, van Deemen and Vergunst (1998) provide evidence that D66 (a progressive liberal party) may have been the Condorcet winner in several consecutive Dutch elections for Parliament, but it never won those elections and, consequently, could never take the lead in the formation of a new government.
In this paper we study voting correspondences which are Condorcet Consistent and which do not admit situations where ranking one's favorite alternative first may turn this alternative from a winner into a looser, or ranking one's least favorite alternative last may turn this from a looser into a winner -in the two-alternative referendum on the Ukraine Association treaty mentioned above both these situations occurred. In Nurmi (2002) and Pérez (2001) these phenomena are referred to as the positive and negative strong no show paradoxes, respectively. Recently, Felsenthal and Nurmi (2016) investigated a number of well-known Condorcet Consistent voting correspondences with respect to the occurrence of these two paradoxes. They find that the Minimax Rule rules out both. The Minimax Rule chooses those alternatives for which a minimal number of voters rank some other alternative higher.
We call the avoidance of these paradoxes the Top Property and the Bottom Property, respectively. Thus, the Top Property says that if an additional voter ranks a winning alternative on top then that alternative remains winning, and the Bottom Property says that if an additional voter ranks a loosing alternative at bottom then that alternative remains loosing. As one of the main results in the paper we establish the maximal Condorcet Consistent voting correspondence H that satisfies the Top Property, that is: each Condorcet Consistent voting correspondence satisfying the Top Property must be contained in H and, a fortiori, H is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with the two properties. We also show that this result remains true if we add the Bottom Property, but not if we replace the Top Property by the Bottom Property. The Minimax Rule in particular is contained in H. Furthermore, we show that also voting functions (single-valued or resolute voting correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent (i.e., they choose a Condorcet winner if there is one) and rule out both paradoxes must select from H, and we exhibit several ways in which this can or cannot be done. Moulin (1988) shows that if there are at least four alternatives and at least twenty-five voters, no Condorcet Consistent voting function can satisfy a condition called 'participation': this condition requires that no voter can be worse off by voting than by abstention. The participation condition rules out the no show paradox as formulated in Brams and Fishburn (1983) . This no show paradox is weaker (hence, occurs more often) than the combination of the two strong versions that we consider and, consequently, the participation condition in Moulin (1988) is stronger than the combination of the Top Property and the Bottom Property. See also Jimeno et al (2009 ), Brandt et al (2017 , and Núñez and Sanver (2017) for extensions and strengthenings of the results in Moulin (1988) on the (weak) no show paradox; and Felsenthal and Tideman (2013) and Duddy (2014) on the strong no show paradoxes. In particular, Duddy (2014) allows weak preference rankings and shows that then every Condorcet consistent voting function must exhibit both paradoxes if there are at least four alternatives. We consider linear orderings, that is, strict rankings.
In Section 2 of the paper we provide basic concepts and definitions, and in Section 3 we consider voting correspondences. Our main result is Corollary 3.8, which states that the correspondence H alluded to above is the maximal voting correspondence that is Condorcet Consistent and satisfies both the Top Property and Bottom Property. In Section 4 we consider voting functions with these properties, which are necessarily selections from H. We may, in particular, choose from the Minimax Rule according to a fixed tie-breaking ordering, but this result does not extend to H. Section 5 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Basic definitions
We let A denote the finite set of alternatives. The set of potential voters is N. A ranking is a linear ordering (reflexive, complete, transitive, and antisymmetric) over A, and L denotes the set of rankings. For a finite set N ⊆ N,
a profile where each i ∈ N has ranking R i and j has ranking R j . Also, for R ∈ L, (R N , R ) denotes a profile for N and an additional voter with ranking R . For a ranking R we denote by t(R) its top alternative and by b(R)
For two distinct alternatives x and y,
denotes the net number of voters ranking x over y. Clearly, n xy (R
is called the (maximal ) resistance against x. Note that n xy (R N ) and m x (R N ) have the same parity (odd or even) as |N |.
An alternative x is a (weak) Condorcet winner at
The (possibly empty) set of Condorcet winners is denoted by C(R N ), hence
Remark 2.1. Clearly, if m x (R N ) < 0 for some x ∈ A, then n yx (R N ) < 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}, which in turn implies n xy (R N ) > 0 and thus m y (R N ) > 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Therefore, C(R N ) = {x}. In this case, x is the unique Condorcet winner, usually called the strong Condorcet winner.
A voting correspondence C assigns to each profile R N a nonempty subset C(R N ) of A, and a voting function F assigns to each profile R N an alternative
3 Condorcet Consistency, Top Property, and Bottom Property for voting correspondences
Let C be a voting correspondence. The following properties are of central interest in this paper.
Top Property (TP) For every profile R N , every j ∈ N \ N , every x ∈ A, and every R j with t(
Bottom Property (BP) For every profile R N , every j ∈ N \ N , every x ∈ A, and every
Condorcet Consistency says that if there exist Condorcet winners, then exactly those should be chosen. The two other properties guarantee that the following two situations cannot occur. First, if x is chosen and an additional voter ranks x at top, then x is no longer chosen; second, if x is not chosen and an additional voter ranks x at bottom, then x is chosen. Thus, in theses cases, the additional voter would be better off by abstention. The Top Property and the Bottom Property prevent exactly these so-called strong no show paradoxes.
Remark 3.1. The requirement of Condorcet Consistency can be subject to discussion in some situations. Suppose, of 99 voters, 50 rank a on top, b second, and all other candidates below a and b. The remaining 49 voters rank b on top and a last. Then a is the (unique, strong) Condorcet winner but one could argue that b is a much better compromise.
A main goal of this paper is to investigate which voting correspondences satisfy all three properties. A first result concerns the Minimax Rule, which dates back to Black (1958) , Simpson (1969) , and Kramer (1977) . The Minimax Rule M is defined by
hence it chooses those alternatives against wich resistance is minimal. The following result is already known (e.g., Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2016; Felsenthal and Tideman, 2013; and Pérez, 2001 ), but for completeness we provide a proof in the Appendix. Until further notice we concentrate on CC and TP, and investigate if it is possible to choose alternatives additional to those in M without violating TP. The following example may be instructive. 
, then choosing x and adding rankings with x on top and (as worst case) y second may cause y to become a Condorcet winner before x, unless already at R N , x has sufficient support against y: we need that n xy (R N ) > −m y (R N ), since then y can never become a Condorcet winner by adding rankings with x on top. This condition is equivalent to the condition n yx (R N ) < m y (R N ). Indeed, one can indeed easily check that in Example 3.3 the inequality holds for x = b and y = c but not for x = a and y = c.
These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 3.4. The voting correspondence H is defined by
Clearly, the implication in the definition of H is trivially satisfied for alternatives x against which resistance m
. We first prove the following result. Proof. First, we show that
, where the strict inequality follows
, a contradiction, so this case cannot occur. Now we show that H not only satisfies CC and TP but is, moreover, the maximal voting correspondence satisfying these conditions, in the following sense.
Proposition 3.6. Let C be a voting correspondence satisfying CC and TP.
for some x ∈ A \ {x}, i.e., x does not have the maximal resistance against y at the profile
. . , R ). This violates TP of C.
Moreover, it turns out that H also prevents the other no show paradox that we consider in this paper.
For voting correspondences C and C we write
Combining the last two propositions we obtain the following.
Corollary 3.8. C ⊆ H for all voting correspondences C satisfying CC, TP, and BP.
In words, H is the maximal voting correspondence that is Condorcet Consistent and avoids the two strong no show paradoxes, i.e., satisfies properties BP and TP, in the sense that it contains every other voting correspondence with these three properties. By using the following lemma we can even strengthen this result. For every a ∈ A, define the voting correspondence C a by
Lemma 3.9. For every a ∈ A, C a satisfies CC, TP, and BP.
Finally, suppose y ∈ A and y / ∈ C a (R N ), and let R ∈ L with y = b( R).
Corollary 3.8 and Lemma 3.9 imply that H is the union of all voting correspondences C = H satisfying CC, TP, and BP. Thus, there is no strict subcorrespondence of H that contains all voting correspondences, unequal to H, with these three properties. Define the voting correspondence Y (cf. Young, 1977) by 
. By Proposition 3.6 this implies that Y does not satisfy TP, a fact also shown by Felsenthal and Nurmi (2016) 
We start with the following result, which still needs a proof, due to the adapted definition of CC. This proof, however, is a minor modification of the proof of Proposition 3.6, and for completeness provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1. Let voting function F satisfy CC and TP. Then F is a selection from H.
Thus, for a voting function to be Condorcet Consistent and satisfy the Top Property, it has to select from H, and the question arises how this can be done.
1
It cannot be done arbitrarily, as the following example shows. 
However, if we wish F to satisfy TP, we must have
A general characterization of all selections from H that satisfy CC and TP and/or BP is yet out of reach. However, we will exhibit some possibilities and impossibilities in the remainder of this section.
Selecting independently
We discuss selections from H that are independent of the underlying rankings and only depend on the alternatives chosen by H. More precisely, we consider the following property for a selection F from a correspondence C.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
If this condition is satisfied, then we say that F satisfies IIA with respect to C. 
Proposition 4.3. Let voting correspondence C be surjective and let voting function F be a selection from C. Then F satisfies IIA with respect to C if and only if there is a Q
In other words, IIA is equivalent to choosing according to a fixed ranking Q if the voting correspondence is surjective. The latter is true for any voting correspondence that is Condorcet Consistent:
Lemma 4.4. Let voting correspondence C satisfy CC. Then C is surjective.
Remark 4.5. Note that we could have used a profile with any even number of voters in the proof Lemma 4.4. For an odd number of voters, however, it is not difficult to see that a Condorcet winner, if it exists, is unique and strong, since the resistance against any alternative is also odd in that case (cf. Remark 2.1).
Our first result about voting functions satisfying CC, TP and BP is as follows.
Proposition 4.6. Every selection F from M that satisfies IIA with respect to M , satisfies T P and BP .
Proof. Let F be a selection from M satisfying IIA with respect to M .
First, we show that
, and R ∈ L with t(R ) = x. By IIA of F with respect to M , it is sufficient to show that
Thus, selections from the Minimax Rule according to a fixed ranking (cf. Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 4.3) prevent both no show paradoxes considered in this paper. It turns out, however, that -if there are at least three alternatives -we cannot select independently from H and still have TP or BP. 
Non-independent selections
According to Proposition 4.6, independent (IIA) selections from M satisfy TP and BP. We now provide examples of selections from M that satisfy TP but not BP, and conversely. Consequently, those selections cannot be achieved by maximizing according to a fixed ranking. (See the Appendix for the proofs of the claims in this subsection.) Example 4.8. Define the voting correspondenceM bȳ 
for every profile R N . Fix a ranking Q ∈ L and define the selectionF fromM such that, for every profile R N ,F (R N )Qy for all y ∈M (R N ). ThenF satisfies TP but not BP. and call this profile R * . Let Q = bac ∈ L and for every profile
. This voting function F satisfies both TP and BP.
Example 4.11. Let A = {a, b, c}, consider again the profile R * of Example 4.10, let now Q = bca ∈ L, and define F as in Example 4.10, now using this Q. Then F satisfies TP but not BP. 
Concluding remarks
We have provided a necessary condition for a voting correspondence to satisfy Condorcet Consistency while at the same time ruling out the two strong no show paradoxes, namely that it should be a subcorrespondence of H. The basic idea leading to the definition of H is that by adding additional voters Condorcet winners may pop up expelling existing winners -the condition defining H rules out exactly this. A remaining problem is to find sufficient conditions for voting correspondences to satisfy these properties. Also, the construction of all selections from H, i.e., voting functions, that choose a Condorcet winner if there is one and rule out the strong no show paradoxes, is an open problem.
A Remaining proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If C(R N ) = ∅ for some profile R N , then by Remark 2.1 either there is a unique alternative x with m x (R N ) < 0, in which case
. , R ). This violates TP of C.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Suppose that F satisfies IIA with respect to C. We construct a ranking Q as in the proposition. First, take 
Proof of the claims in Example 4.8 We first show thatF satisfies BP. Let
We will use the notation β z ( R P ) = |{i ∈ P : b( R i ) = z}| for a profile R P and an alternative z ∈ A. If x / ∈M (R N , R ) thenF (R N , R ) = x and we are done. Thus, we assume 
Proof of the claims in Example 4.9 We first prove TP ofF . Let R N be a profile with x =F (R N ) and let R ∈ L with t(R ) = x. We have to show thať
, where the strict inequality follows from z ∈ M (R N ) \M (R N ) (with β-notation as in the preceding proof). Hence we have z ∈ M (R N , R ) \M (R N , R ). This concludes the proof of the claim.
Since x is the maximal element ofM (R N ) according to ranking Q, the above claim implies that it is also the maximal element ofM (R N , R ) according to ranking Q, and thereforeF (R N , R ) = x, as was to be proved. To show thatF does not satisfy BP we exhibit the following example of a 
Proof of the claims in Example 4.10 We first show that F satisfies BP. Due to Proposition 3.2 we only have to consider cases in which (i) b is not chosen but by adding a ranking with b at bottom we obtain profile R * and (ii) the cases in which we add to R * a new ranking with bottom alternative a or c. 
